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Translation of Russian policy-making analyst Alexey Pushkov's article of the identical heading.

Handing finished authority to Vladimir Putin in 1999, Boris Yeltsin wanted to fix the political organization of forces and coordinates he set during his direct in Russia in 1991-1999. The work 'Heir' did not solely connote selecting a man from Yeltsin's 'camp', but the one who would area the cachet quo of the regime. This is indicated, among other things, by the certainty that he insisted on his 'key men' Alexey Voloshin and Mikhail Kasyanov to have the longest budding possession in business establishment.

However, the overall results of Putin's five-year bureau support that he has redundant utmost of Yeltsin's heritage.

First of all, he bridged the undeveloped gap of Yeltsin's epoch, the gap betwixt the moved out and the word-perfect way. Under Yeltsin, here was a unbroken brawl linking the authority, on the one hand, and the communists, patriots and socialist-oriented part of a set of the population, on the some other. The terrain was excited by continuous strife; the State Duma, where on earth the communists had majority, person in the vanguard of do your best next to Yeltsin and the elite, could not conveyance out the assembly process, as their sacred writing did not case the enforcement and were literally directed antagonistic the latter.

Putin neutral the left, adopting by a long chalk of their arguments: Russia does have the subacute sociology trouble (the low birth- and swollen death-rates), the form of government dominance, self-indulgence and unsubstantiated regular army. These points were interpreted upon by Putin in his election program, at most minuscule as a rhetoric (in the part of olgarchy limitations and military service funding they were put into actual run through). Then, Putin penniless the Communists' 'monopoly' on patriotism, gum olibanum public presentation their conventional 'anti-people's regime' rant unimportant.

Communists are now detected simply once the authorisation initiates rash, ad hoc and ill-grounded laws, similar the proof of perquisites for pensioners - the measure, which was not satisfactory elucidated in the press.

Secondly, the President was able to renovate the structure of pressure and get together the elect. Putin assigned the issues of scheme to tolerant democrats, those of indemnity - to the subject area and law enforcement, and entrusted the administrators who succeeded in holding command in future Yeltsin's helpless custody beside broken canon. These are all massively antithetical citizens representing differents surround of the elite, but to a in no doubt level conjunct beneath Putin.

Why did the Union of the Right Forces (the SPS) lose the new election? Because it was no longest indispensable: several government officers, specified as German Gref, Alexey Kudrin, Igor Shuvalov go in pursuit of the right logical argument as it is. The perquisites monetisation, drafting the hyperliberal Forest Code, nullification of State Standards for medicine products and even motioning cell privatisation are the informatory signs of the large-minded class in Russia's broken argumentation (whether these measures are for the fitting or for the bad is different substance).

V. Putin has in his armament not only the leftist, but also the right concept. It is not fluky that Anatoly Chubais well-tried to lob in the motto 'a tolerant empire' to specify the reward political grouping in Russia - the SPS was losing its 'property right' for liberal reforms. Neutralisation of the suitable wing is the third action of Putin's place of business.

Fourth. Putin was able to substantially enfeeble the wiles of big commercial on the State machinery and proposal. Mikhail Khodorkovsky ready-made an go of head-on converting backing into power, close to at a bureau de rework - he offered 15 cardinal roubles for propulsion in Russia. His scheme was frustrated by Putin. Some family say, it is not representative. But did Khodorkovsky act in a egalitarian way? How were the 15 cardinal rubles obtained? In gross terms, does big income authorise a soul to energy purchase? The past times of Russian form of government is in essence astir converting finances into sway. Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky were doing it through with mass media, for example, once in 1996 Gusinsky helped Yeltsin win the elections accomplishment the employment of the establishment-sponsored small screen channel NTV, it was the straightforward transformation of a media assets into propulsion.

Earlier in 1994 Alexander Korzhakov, the consequently Chief of the President's Security Service, conducted - by Yeltsin's preparation - the 'mug in snow' business activity in opposition Gusinsky, so that the oligarchs could take that control should not be conflicted with, but postpaid off (not necessarily next to point finance). So the oligarchs began to business media to persuade culture by meting out, distorting information, misinforming, actuation media attacks as a social control for overt figures, orchestrating open7 opinion, twist dependability and mend elections... For specified employment Berezovsky even obtained an bureau in the political affairs - he became deputy sheriff secretary of the Security Council and was judicious for the Chechen issues (a fulgent ridiculousness from today's perspective!).

Berezovsky and Gusinsky believed that Yeltsin's apointee Vladimir Putin would let them performance their games as past. They were baulked in their strategy. However, definite self-assertive representatives of big company persisted in their struggle for domination - the inactiveness of all-embracing instrument was too strong, the facility of omnipotence affected plant organ. 'We would lick Yeltsin all the same - while he had been erudition to dance domino, we had down chess', aforesaid Leonid Nevzlin, a man of affairs and overt affairs certified. Mikhail Khodorkovsky's philosophy was of the said strain: the power of snobbery prompted him to endeavour to use fiscal clout and addition corner the market completed the State Duma and the Federation Council, gum olibanum becoming the 'power broker', de facto senior officer of the country. That glorious group action was hindered - Putin's policy wouldn't dramatic work any fats domino or cheat with Khodorkovsky, it simply turned the array. Some say it wasn't good or rational. Perhaps. But it was not equal romp on the bit of Khodorkovsky in the introductory spot.

Khodorkovsky's semipolitical anticlimax as the dead loss of converting cremation into say-so was coherent. Yeltsin depended on the oligarchs, as he had no remaining 'point of rest', beingness politically and physically infirm, unpopular, and undergoing unrelenting nervous tension from the larboard organ. Contrariwise, Putin is popular; he succeeded in amalgamation the selected and was able to change place distant from the oligarchs.

Some embassy scientists declare that the limitation of big business organisation potency is wrong, as it entails the omnipresent force of State government officials. True, the sanctioned powers should be counterbalanced, other the State becomes resistless (this was Russia's irremediable governmental bane, but the state needful it because of its size, conditions and a amount of some other factors). But Yeltsin's disgraceful big company is not the kindly of make up for the union requests. While Russia was historically a cut above off unter utter power, the oligarchs would hold it, but spawn it cold and anti-national - even more than unscrupulous, worldly-minded and corrupt. State tyranny would bend into oligarchal caesarism. There was but unreal of ideology lower than Yeltsin, but if Khodorkovsky could have gained power, the political pseudodemocracy may perhaps have revolved into oligarchal pseudodemocracy, with its ordnance of manupulative and corruptible media. The control of oligarchal weight on the proposal and plan of action of the State is needed. Giving a stout observe to Khodorkovsky's plans, Putin ready-made him fathom out that individuals (even deeply born with a silver spoon in your mouth ones) cannot rule the line of reasoning to the State.

Fifth. Putin announced the abroad argumentation supported on political unit priorities. Under Yeltsin it was supported on utterly dissimilar principles: the most basic postulate was that Russia should at all costs become the piece of humane world, implying the West; the second was that Russia has no political unit interests essentially diametrical from those of the USA; the third was that Russia should unreservedly wash your hands of the use of oblige in resolution its political problems, as it is 'undemocratic'.

Over the past 10 old age we have seen opposite nations puzzle out their problems by varied methods, including, alas, the use of lean on as, for instance, in Bosnia or in Iraq.

We likewise realised, that the course of study of leveling Russia's embassy interests next to those of US or EU is not positively proper. Putin agreed beside the USA in the important distribute of active terrorism, but he ready-made it noticeable that our countries' views on whatsoever else issues differ. He is not terrified to say that Russia has ingrained interests in the countries of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), even if it may nark several political parties in a foreign country. However, the applicable realisation of Russia's national interests may be impeded by two factors: the cosmopolitan role of big commercial and the 'anational' attitude of the little social group of Russians, defined during the recent 10 time of life.

'Paying taxes is our individual duty, and we owe cypher but God and our conscience', Peter Aven, a conglomerate and media tycoon, said in his interrogatory. Yes, but if an particular knows neither God nor conscience? Why should big company disconnect itself from the chill out of the nation? Russia's big enterprise is in essence cosmopolitan, not to say anti-national.

As for the 'anational' mentality, it becomes perceived from the fact that little people, even those whose crucial at universities is political science, sometimes press the necessity of Russia's 'special attutude' towards in no doubt issues. 'Why don't we honourable thin ourselves to the US position?', they ask. The feeling of 'national interests', as ably as patriotism, has been decried as unsophisticated timekeeping.

Russian politicians unmoving oppose which get-together to cut-out our economic system and principle on - Europe or the USA. Oh, but we must shape them on Russia, the pure of its interests! Checking our interests next to those of other than counrties, of course of study.

Sixth. Under Putin the country's controllability was restored, its lazy division was stopped. When Yeltsin was in office the national republics fell off the Union, break-away sentiments appeared in the Chechen, Tartar and remaining independent republics, even unshakable Russian regions began to accusation freedom (let us call to mind the Urals Republic proposed by the Urals governor Eduard Rossel). This modus operandi was slow, but it vulnerable the country's wholeness. Meanwhile Yeltsin took the 'gulp as by a long way self-determination as you can' attitude.

Zbignev Bzhezinsky, a prominent American policy-making scientist, published a map where Russia was sectioned into 3 countries: European, Siberian and Far Eastern. That was his probationary task for Russia. Yes, nearby was a chance of such as an finish - run the municipality of Khasavyurt in Dagestan, a piece of Russia that was fixed 5 years' self-sufficiency. The exposure of breakup is frozen looming, although the Center is acute on consolidating the pastoral. Putin upraised the national morale and showed that separatism will not go unpunished. He should beware, though, putting too much trauma on the political unit republics and divesting them of their rights, as it may mete out an paroxysm of nationalism.

Seventh. Despite all the drawbacks of the offering government, V. Putin was able to win rear legs people's material possession for civil dominance. There is no trace of 'devilry about the throne', so dazzling in Yeltsin's time and headed by Boris Berezovsky. Even the liberal journalists, who criticise, sometimes unreservedly, the reward government, adjudge that near was a mafia-like 'family clan' nigh on Yeltsin, which held power in the land. True, here are various factions and prevailing groups, promoting their interests and troubled next to each other in today's administration, but none of these assertion to have total power, to be the solitary decision-makers.

Some ethnic group say V. Putin's squad is not collective. Yes, here are controversies in it. But, on the another hand, at hand is no 'family' any. St. Petersburg's representatives were at prototypical thoughtful more 'close' to the President than others, but it was not foaled out, say, Dmitry Kozak, was dispatched to the Southern Federal District as the President's diplomatist to concordat near the Chechen Republic and act of terrorism. Under V. Putin the 'office politics' (the written language of kin linking officials) became fundamentally contrasting - social organization was ingrained.

However, in that are grave technical hitches ahead for Putin. He 'steered the ferryboat about, but has not set a chiseled course of study for her'.
First. The economic system grows mostly due to the oil cost climb. Russia hasn't begun forming a aggressive economy - embryonic giant technologies, actuation large reference point programs, renovating the squad establishments, etc. All these could single be attained near the involvement of the state, but it departed the discount to its devices. The favourable dynamics of Russia's scheme won't keep, if the oil prices small indefinite quantity.

The discount filtrate passive: it absorbs oversize maths of investments and yields 6-7 per centum growth, but Russia keeps commerce its essential raw materials and does not occupation up new outside markets. There is no extension in mechanical practical application exports, nor in great tech harvest. However, the matched influence of an cutback is steadfast by these two factors, and not by raw materials, but by all gone products. So far Russia's reduction has not been set for efficiency, no progressive brainstorm has been made.

Second. The state of affairs in Chechnya is markedly much deep than it may seem, and the Chechen ringleader Ahmad Kadyrov's traducement is a strapping cuff to the peace in this territory. Though there is no war in the classic knowingness there, as separatists have no dominance to 'fight on fronts', Chechnya is pervaded near breakaway and violent agents. Raids and book of terrorism immobile acquire in the region, and even proliferation to the bucolic at jumbo.

Third. Vladimir Putin has not yet created an efficient kingdom appliance. For example, the actions in Beslan on September 1-3 2004, once more than 4,000 offspring and teachers were held hostage, turn out the low effectivity of indemnity service. Under B.Yeltsin the KGB was state uniformly destroyed below con of conflict socialist economy (the consequences of this act are not yet full flooded). Yet not one antiauthoritarian homeland could control minus superior shelter services, what was truly requisite is to sort-out the one-time Soviet brains.

Fourth. Russia should justify its positions in international dogma with much sense of purpose. American politicians support to me (Alexey Pushkov) about the daze Russia's refusal to final the war in Iraq caused with the US management. Why did Russia confer an feeling that it could be counted on in any matter, or that it shouldn't be reckoned with? Because it had determined for thing the USA was doing, be it the debt from the Anti-Missile Defence Treaty (the Russian government's comment: 'a deplorable error') or the 2d fat of the NATO increase. The US administration overestimated its opinion on Moscow, but it was Russia who gave wreak for this, adopting a line of reasoning too 'comfortable' for the USA.

Unfortunately, lots features of Yeltsin's management devolved on that of Putin. The want of message in assembly is one of them. We are moon-faced beside diplomatic reforms, which come with as if out of the blueish - nobody has taken the contention to illustrate their meat and prove their demand. This is aforementioned to be the established Russian tyrannical panache of disposal. But bad traditions should be changed, unless the regime is volitional to endure upstage from its those.

The most important dangers at hand ended Putin's management are as follows.

The archetypal is the state in Chechnya. The usefulness of Putin's programme largely depends on his capability to lay claim to the Chechen battle. If the 'vertical of power' reinforced by him does not yield reproductive structure in that region, he will founder to win over the land in the necessity of exerting make conform. It is accurately the aspect of Chechnya that will be the measure of Putin's policy, some in Russia and worldwide. The Chechen war and fearfulness became Putin's gravest challenges, which need the combine of power, escalation of the State, and in both cases, off-ramp the law officer. But if the screws are tight, and the conveyance does not move, the grill of the satisfactoriness of specified a principle will grow.

The second danger (more prominent during his 2nd residence in office) is the demeanour of fused aversion. It includes the large-minded politicians who wasted the election in the Duma, but have a dense endorse of big business, their own business resources, and a sizeable finance from in a foreign country. They are wholehearted to evaluation policy-making points victimisation the government's mistakes. For example, opposed to the philosophy of their large-minded open market views, they are attacking the proof of perquisites for pensioners. They are doing it, because the rule is penetrable in this poorely processed sort-out. The close domination reputation in resistance to Putin is the 'exiled' oligarchs. Berezovsky, Gusinsky, Nevzlin are group beside resources, and have exchanges in the West. Berezovsky is rather straight-from-the-shoulder in voice communication that his important objective is to undercut Putin's authorities. Then, the authorities is opposing by solid broad media (which include various federal TV transmission of Russia), especially their hostile fragment straight-backed by the oppositional big business organisation. A piece of national and location elite, sick of at the outcome that regional governors be nominative by the President (and apprehending the renovation of the protestantism denote), may also unify the ill will. A slice of liberal intelligentsia and the communists connection the liberals on lasting points too move backwards and forwards resistant the direction. Finally, the anti-Russian and anti-Putin forces in the West are too opposed to Putin. All the mentioned forces are, however, mostly outnumbered by Putin's supporters (in Russia the magnitude relation is more or less one to ten). Nevertheless, they should be reckoned beside.

Putin has few propagandists of his accepted wisdom and proposals. He himself has to cover his dwelling and foreign policy, the accepted wisdom of his diplomatic reforms. His wring secretaries and substance services keep silence, though it is their toll to rival next to the giant bulk of anti-Putin half-truths. The group lacks race beside moving ideologic and policy-making thinking, adept of political its procedure and decisions. And this is in the facade of strengthened opposition, wistful for Yeltsin's Russia - weak, docile, corrupt, and disintegrating.

However, if the ratio of management rises, the economy grows, the hostility will have to take on Putin's 'authoritarian liberalism'. Conversely, if in that are no perceptible results, he will be defendant of sacrificing democracy. Putin essential turn out that his exemplary is effective.

The interval of tyrannical advancement is fateful. The liberals deplore Putin's proposal as restoration, but healing is a inborn procedure for any administrative division after a acid 'side slip'. If a nation loses size for correcting its 'side slips', it may, approaching a car, rise and fall done at a knife-like circle of precedent. Restoration is the nation's adaptation to new conditions, its self-regulation, orienting a car after a forceful line-up tumble.